Belief updating schemes in artificial intelligence may be viewed as three dimensional languages, consisting of a syntax (e.g. probabilities or certainty factors), a calculus (e.g. Bayesian or CF combination rules), and a semantics (i.e. cognitive interpretations of competing formalisms). This paper studies the rational scope of those languages on the syntax and calculus grounds. In particular, the paper presents an endomorphism theorem which highlights the limitations imposed by the conditional independence assumptions implicit in the CF calculus. Implications of the theorem to the relationship between the C F and the Bayesian languages and the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence are presented. The paper concludes with a discussion of some implications on rule-based knowledge engineering in uncertain domains.
INTRODUCTION
In order for a computer program to be a plausible model of a (more or less) rational process of human expertise, the program should be capable of representing beliefs in a language that is (more or less) calibrated with a well-specified normative criterion, e.g. the axioms of subjective probability [I], the theory of confirmation [Z], formal logic, etc.
According t o Shafer and Tversky, the building blocks of a probabilistic language are syntax, calculus, and semantics [3]. The syntax is a set of numbers, commonly referred to as degrees of belief (e.g. standard probabilities or certainty factors), used to parameterize uncertain facts, inexact rules, and competing hypotheses. Typically, a set of atomic degrees of belief is elicited directly from a human expert, while compound degrees of belief are computed through a set of operators collectively known as a belief calculus. The semantics of the language can be viewed as a mapping from a real-life domain of expertise onto the belief language. This mapping provides a cognitive interpretation as well as descriptive face-validity t o both the syntax and the calculus dimensions of the language.
Given the critical role that a belief language plays in determining both the low-level mechanics and the high-level ordinal ranking of the recommendations generated by an expert system, it is clear that the implicit rationality of the language is directly related to both the internal and external validities of computer-based expertise. By 'rationality7 I refer here to the normative criteria of consistency and completeness [I] as well as to the psychometric criteria of reliability and validitgl [4] . It is argued that the performance of any expert, whether a human being or a computer program, should be evaluated and rated along those lines.
The two mainstream belief languages in rule-based inference systems are the normative Bayesian and the descriptive certainty factors (CF) languages, the latter being representative of a wide variety of ad-hoc calculi of uncertainty. It seems that the CF method is currently the most widely used belief language in applied expert systems, primarily due to the popularity of such CF-based shells as EMYCIN [Pearl, 9] .
Notwithstanding the critical importance of exploring the practical scope of noncategorical rule-based inference systems, few studies have compared belief languages on rational as well as cognitive grounds. Furthermore, practitioners are often oblivious to the theoretical limitations inherent in the representation and synthesis of degrees of belief. This has led to a number of commonly held misconceptions regarding some properties of the C F and the Bayesian languages, such as the following two conjectures: C1: Classical Bayesian methods are either too simplistic or too complex: in order for a Bayesian updating procedure to be computationally feasible, strict statistical independence must prevail. This requirement is rarely met in practice, where interaction effects among clues and hypotheses make the Bayesian solution unmanageable on combinatorial grounds. The CF calculus, on the other hand, does not make explicit assumptions of statistical independence; therefore, it can be used to model realistically complicated problems that defy a normative Bayesian interpretation.
C2: Both the Bayesian and the C F calculi are special cases of the general DempsterShafer theory of evidence [lo] . Hence, they may be construed as two alternative and competing belief languages, each specialized t o deal with a particular class of problems and probabilistic designs.
Toward the end of the paper a rather different interpretation of both C1 and C2 will be presented. The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents some necessary background and terminology. Section 3 provides a brief review of the C F language and its rational (Bayesian) interpretation. Section 4 presents three lemmas that are further integrated into an endomorphism theorem. This theorem shows that the CF language is a speciaI case of the Bayesian language. Similar results have been proven in the past by Adams (1 11, Heckerman [12], and Grosof [13] . Section 5 presents some preliminary thoughts about the computational complexity of wholistic (not conditionally independent) inference problems. The paper concludes with some implications on knowledge engineering and future research directiom In order to avoid the apologetic debate of whether or not the function F exists, we note that F is presented here primarily for the sake of clear exposition. In fact, the relationship between BEL and F is at the center of an intensified philosophical debate that has been going strong for more than 300 years. In short, under a Bayesian interpretation (e.g. Ramsey), BEL = P = F, where P is the standard Savage/de Finetti subjective probability function. Objectivists (like Popper) argue that F stands aloof from P (or, for that matter, from any personal BEL), and, hence, in general, P # F.
Proponents of the logical school of probability model BEL through Carnap's uconfirmationu function C(.) [Z] . A similar approach is taken by the certainty factors formalism, which sets BEL = CF.
Finally, pragmatic Bayesians (like myself) feel that BEL = P is our best shot at F, a shot whose accuracy is directly related to the operational characteristics of the elicitation procedure designed to construct P. Since P is subject to an internal axiomatic system, I term IBEL-PI an 'internal bias' and IBEL-Fl an 'external bias.' Attempts to reduce those biases are termed 'debiasing' or 'corrective procedures' in the cognitive psychology literature [e.g. 141.
Let V be the subset of all "interestingm (i.e, non-arbitrary) inference problems <h,el, ..., em> defined over S. The following set of definitions partitions V into three classes of problems that vary in terms of their computational (and cognitive) complexity. This partitioning is a reflection of the fact that some problems that require expertise may be simple 'open and shut' cases, while other problems may be complicated and vague. In what follows, I wish t o provide a more precise definition of this taxonomy of problems, based on the underlying complexity of their diagnostic structures.
Diagnostic Structure: the diagnostic structure of a problem q = <h,el, ..., em> is the conditional distribution F(el, ..., emlh).
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Weakly Decomposable Problems: the set of weakly decomposable problems WD is defined as follows:
Decomposable Problems: the set of decomposable problems D is defined as follows: D = {q I q = {h,el, ..., em) is weakly decomposable and F(el, ..., em) = F(el)* .
Wholistic Problems: a problem q is wholistic if q E V -WD Corollary: D C WD C V C S Note that ndecomposability" is a weaker notion of statistical independence. The latter requires that events be independent in all subsets, e.g. P(abc) = P(a)P(b)P(c), P(ab) = P(a)P(b), P(ac) = P(a)P(c), and P(bc) = P(b)P(c). Decomposability requires only the first constraint, i.e. P(abc) = P(a)P(b)P(c).
THE CF LANGUAGE AND ITS RATIONAL INTERPRETATION
This section provides a brief account of the definition and interpretation of the certainty factors language, as stated by Shortliffe and Buchanan in [lo] . Given a problem q = <h,el, ..., em> E V, the C F syntax approximates the posterior belief associated with q through the difference between a measure of increased belief (MB) and a measure of increased disbelief (MD) in the hypothesis h in light of the clues <el, ..., em> :
The C F calculus is a set of operators designed to combine atomic CF's into compound CF's (e.g. compute BEL(hla,b) from BEL(h1a) and BEL(h1b)). This paper focuses only on a subset of this calculus, denoted hereafter (Ml-M2):
Note that (MI-M2) appears to convey a certain descriptive appeal: if you open the parentheses of (Ml) for example, you obtain the sum of MB(h1a) and MEl(h1b) minus their multiplicative interaction effect. The resulting combination rule is both commutative and associative, as one would expect. Shortliffe and Buchanan have also suggested a syntactical mapping from Bayesian probabilities to certainty factors, defined as follows:
I term the (Rl-R2) mapping a rational interpretation for three reasons. First, the mapping is intended to convey a certain degree of descriptive face-validity to the CF syntax. For example, (Rl) represents the measure of increased belief in h in light of the piece of evidence a as a normalized difference between the posterior P(hla) and the prior P(h). Second, the mapping relates CF's to a subset of the real interval [0,1] which is consistent with the seven rational postulates of Savage and de Finetti (i.e. the axioms of subjective probability 
Note in passing that (MI-M2) is very different from (Rl-R2
). The former pair of combination rules is the nucleus of the CF calculus, designed to compute the compound strength of belief of two parallel pieces of evidence. The latter pair of definitions is a suggested ex-post Bayesian interpretation of certainty factors which is not necessarily unique. The 
THE CF LANGUAGE AS A SPECIAL CASE OF THE BAYESIAN LANGUAGE
Endomorphism Theorem Let CF be the set of all problems that have an approximate posterior solution derived by the CF calculus (MI-M2). Let V be the set of all problems that
DISCUSSION
The endomorphism theorem says that the CF calculus (Rl-R2) has a rational interpretation if and only if it is restricted to weakly decomposable problems. Under these conditions, the CF belief synthesis rule is equivalent to the likelihood ratio version of the Bayesian belief updating rule. As was mentioned at the beginning of the paper, the fact that the CF calculus makes implicit assumptions of conditional independence was proved elsewhere, e.g. by Adams [ll] , Heckerman [12] , and Grosof [13] . The present theorem is useful in that it highlights the important implications of the CFlBayesian relationship on the rational scope of CF-based inference systems.
In the pictorial illustration of the theorem, q is a wholistic problem that is outside the rational scope of the CF language (e.g. q = <h,a,b> has a "synergisticw diagnostic structure, i.e. F(a,blh)>F(alh)-F(b1h)). At the same time, however, q does have a (complicated) Bayesian posterior belief, by virtue of its membership in V. This dichotomy means that one cannot trade rationality for efficiency, as is sometimes being done in AI. Furthermore The preceding paragraph implies that most CF-based expert systems (and, hence, most applied expert systems) are inconsistent with their rational interpretation (Rl-R2). This finding is disturbing in view of the impressive decision-making performance of some CFbased systems (81. There may be (at least) two potential explanations for the disparity between the narrow normative foundation and the de-facto face-validity of the CF language.
First, I argue that experienced knowledge engineers intuitively know that the endomorphism theorem is true, and, in fact, take advantage of it. In particular, designers of complicated expert systems often feel that the more granular the knowledge-base, the higher is the validity of the system [16] . This heuristic amounts to augmenting an evidence/hypotheses inference net with a multitude of sub hypotheses and intermediate states, designed to partition the knowledge-base and achieve a higher degree of granularity. This judicious decomposition is done in an attempt to explicitly account for interaction effects, and, thereby, induce more conditional independence on the evidence/hypotheses space, as was proposed by Charniak [IS] and by Winter and Girse [17] .
In the context of the present paper, we can describe this practice as follows: when a CF knowledge engineer faces a wholistic problem q which is outside the scope of a rational interpretation, he or she'first modifies the diagnostic structure of the original problem, thus creating a transformation from q to q' f WD, which is a rational CF territory. If there exists a problem q' whose diagnostic structure is indeed a plausible (weak) decomposition of q, a CF-based system applied to q' is likely to provide a (close) rational belief representation to q as well.
The second explanation of the CF descriptive/normative contrast may be that the original rational interpretation of certainty factors (Rl-R2) is subject to doubt. In other words, it seems that the CF language is indeed a novel formalism that deserves a serious look, especially on practical and descriptive grounds. Indeed, the fact that the CF language has been going strong for more than a decade in spite of its unrealistically narrow rational interpretation suggests that the model is basically powerful although its normative foundation is weak. Hence, future research is needed to explore new interpretations t o the CF language that will be more plausible on rational, cognitive, and philosophical grounds. An Example of such an undertaking may be found in Heckerman's work [12] on alternative probabilistic interpretations of certainty factors.
Conjecture C1 Revisited
We now turn to the casual conjecture C1, which attributes the impracticality of the Bayesian language vis a vis the CF language t o the fact that real life domains of expertise are not statistically independent. The reader has perhaps realized by now that this statement is based on a semantic rather than a substantive argument. In particular, note that the phenomenon of statistical independence is not directly expressible in the CF formalism. This is consistent with Shafer and Tversky, who observe that some mathematical properties are not translatable from one belief language to another [3]. However, the fact that a particuIar characteristic of the world cannot be described in a certain language does not necessarily imply that this characteristic in nonexistent.
The statistical independence phenomenon is an attribute of nature which stands aloof from the CFlBayesian debate. To clarify this distinction, we may use an analogy from physics. The presence or absence of statistical independence is a unique property of a domain of expertise just as the mass is a unique physical property of a brick. Notwithstanding the mass uniqueness, the weight of the brick varies with different scales (or on different planets). Thus an absolute unique property of nature may be mapped onto different manifestations under different circumstances. Similarly, the manifestation of the independence property may be explicit in some belief languages and vague or even null in others. The crispness of this expression should be construed as a property of the language, not a property of nature.
Conjecture C2 Revisited
The C2 conjecture suggests that both the CF and the Bayesian languages are special cases of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. Although this premise is indeed correct, this truth is quite different from its popular interpretation. That the Bayesian design is a special case of the Dempster-Shafer model is a trivial corollary that can be found in [IS] . Similarly, Gordon and Shortliffe gave a Shaferian belief interpretation to the CF calculus. They then proceeded to conclude that "The Dempster-Shajer combination rule includes the Bayesian and the CF functions as special cases "
[19, p.2731.
In my view, the popular interpretation of this correct argument is depicted in Figure 2a : 1. Apply a rule-based algorithm as though the problem in not wholistic:
2. Devise a new rule-based algorithm to wholistic problems: Figure 3b 3. Transform the wholistic problem q into a more complicated problem q' that nonetheless is (roughly) weakly decomposable. Then apply a rule-based algorithm t o q' : Figure 3c Option 1, which basically amounts to fudging, is, in my opinion, the leading practice among practitioners who use rule-based expert system shells (this impression is not supported by any firm empirical evidence). Moreover, the endomorphism theorem shows that it doesn't really matter if you use a decomposable Bayesian or a CF approach; both fail to handle wholistic diagnostic structures, although the latter appears to be oblivious of this limitation.
Option 2 presents a very tough challenge. Basically, it requires the development of an
In short, the present discussion indicates that within the subset of weakly decomposable problems (WD), CF's are remarkably Bayesian after all. Outside the subset WD, the CF language may have a variety of free-form and appealing descriptive interpretations. A t the same time, those ad-hoc interpretations will not be accountable or testable on rational (Bayesian) grounds. Of course, this restriction may be lifted if either (Rl-R2) or (Ml-M2) are modified or extended in order to cover a larger superset of WD.
IMPLICATIONS O N KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Several authors have stressed the fact that most real-life domains of expertise include problems that are dependant, adjacent, or wholitltic. Clearly, all those definitions basically imply that the diagnostic structure of realistically complex problems is not weakly decomposable. This observation has far-reaching computational implications which may be summarized in the following proposition, which has not yet been proven: determines whether or not the interaction obtains. Furthermore, it is felt that the typical TSP constraint designed to avoid a sub-tour among k < m cities can be mapped onto the constraint that given that the underlying inference problem is wholistic, the computation of BEL cannot afford to disregard a dependency of degree k within the {h,el, ..., ek} space. The objective here is to design these 2m logical constraints in a way that will force the appropriate 0 -1 variables to be set to 0 or 1, thus determining whether or not the respective interaction effect should enter the computation of BEL(hlel, ..., em) in the objective function.
We now turn to the implications of the endomorphism theorem on knowledge engineering in light of the proposition just presented. In particular, we wish to focus on the key question that ought to be addressed, namely: how can a rule-based expert system compute the posterior belief associated with a wholistic problem. Basically, there seem to be three alternative options:
optimal belief updating solution to wholistic problems which is also rule-based, or polynomial in the size of the problem, in some sense. In light of the proposition regarding the computational complexity of wholistic problems, such algorithm will imply that P= NP, amounting to the most staggering finding in complexity theory, and a very unlikely one. If we view the optimal solution of q as a complete combinatorial Bayesian design, and the rule-based solution of q' as a heuristic solution of q, we may bring upon some very strong findings from the probabilistic analysis of the TSP. For example, there is a greedy algorithm that solves the TSP in polynomial time, giving a solution that may not be optimum but is guaranteed to be no worse than twice the optimum path. Furthermore, if some very plausible assumptions are made regarding the layout of the cities (viz, the topology of the diagnostic structure of the problem), this error can become as small as 5% 1221.
CONCLUSION
The approach taken in this paper was to explicitly define the class of inference problem that are solvable in the CF language in a way which is consistent with the theory of probability. The resulting endomorphism theorem is yet another way to show that the CF language makes strong independence assumptions. In the final analyses, it is obvious that conditional dependencies is a phenomenon that we cannot afford to ignore, regardless of the belief language that we choose to adopt. Moreover, it seems that the conditional independence assumption is structurally inherent in any rule-based algorithm, when applied to probabilistic domains. This is unfortunate, since the rulebased architecture is a well established inference technique with some very appealing characteristics. With that in mind, it is argued that future research should concentrate on manipulating the problem space, rather than the algorithm, in order to make it more amenable to a rule-based solution which will also be valid on probabilistic grounds.
Appendix: Proofs
For the sake of brevity, the following proofs are limited t o inference problems with two pieces of evidence. Due to the commutative and associative nature of both Bayes rule and (Ml-M2), these results can be easily extended to any finite number of pieces of evidence.
